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Surfing the Web For Copyright Law:
Why Infringement Claims are All Wet
Jessica Richardson
INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are about to go on a trip to Seattle, a city you
have never visited. You will have a lot of free time in Seattle,
so you turn to the fastest, easiest, most convenient way to
receive current and accurate information: the Internet. You
settle down at your personal computer in the den at home and
dial up your local Internet Service Provider. Unsure of where
to find the information you need, you type in the address for
1
Yahoo! and begin your search. You enter the name of the city,
and within seconds a list of possible Web pages that may be of
interest to you appears. With one point and click of the mouse,
you instruct your computer to display the Seattle Sidewalk
2
3
site, so that you may “virtually” explore the city. You browse
restaurant reviews, hotel availability, museum exhibits, and
theater events. You are thrilled to find that your favorite band
will be playing while you are visiting Seattle. Conveniently,
the Seattle Sidewalk Web page provides a hyperlink to
1. See Yahoo! (visited April 10, 2001) <http://www.yahoo.com>.
2. See Seattle Sidewalk (visited April 10, 2001) <http://www.seattle.
sidewalk.com>.
3. Typing in <www.seattle.sidewalk.com> will no longer take users to
that specific location, but rather to <www.msn.citysearch.com/?brand=
sidewalk>, a similar guide to Seattle’s entertainment and events. In the fall of
2000, Microsoft sold the Sidewalk series to Ticketmaster Online-Citysearch.
Microsoft retained rights to buying guides and business directories, which now
appear through the MSN network. See Bob Tedeschi, Microsoft Selling City
Guides to Ticketmaster for $240 Million, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 1999)
<http://nytimes.qpass.com/qpass-archives>.
This Note describes the
relationship of the companies and the functioning of their Web sites as they
existed prior to Ticketmaster’s acquisition of the Sidewalk series. Although
Microsoft has renamed its site, and Ticketmaster now owns the Sidewalk
series, the formerly adversarial relationship between the two companies
nonetheless provides an ideal framework for the analysis of copyright issues
arising from unauthorized deep linking on the Internet.
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4

Ticketmaster, where you can purchase your ticket. One more
click and a ticket order page appears, the Ticketmaster logo at
the top and the convenient credit card entry at the bottom. You
agree to pay the ticket price and the hefty Ticketmaster
charges, order your tickets, and log off the Internet, content to
have stumbled upon the concert information and excited to
have purchased tickets.
Little do you know that Ticketmaster would argue you
have been breaking the law by simply clicking on links and
5
browsing the Web. This note argues that “normal” hyperlinks,
Hypertext Reference links, do not create a viable cause of
action for copyright infringement. Part I describes the history
and the function of the Internet and specifically details how
hyperlinks work as the primary means of connecting and
retrieving electronic documents viewed on the Web. Part II
describes principles of copyright law and how they currently
apply to the Internet. Part III applies copyright law to a
situation involving hyperlinks that Microsoft created which
allowed users to access the ticket order page of Ticketmaster
Online directly. Through analysis of a common situation
occurring on the Internet, this note proposes that neither the
Internet Service Provider, in facilitating access to the Web and
allowing the creation of hyperlinks, nor the link creator, in
designing hyperlinks that connect Web sites, nor the individual
user, in locating and viewing Web sites via hyperlink
connections, should be held liable for copyright infringement.
I.

TECHNOLOGY OF HYPERTEXT LINKS ON
THE INTERNET

The U.S. government created the Internet in 1965 in order
to connect the Defense Department with radio and satellite
6
networks. Widespread public use has since transformed the
7
Internet into a medium for global communication. During the

4. See Ticketmaster (visited April 10, 2001) <http://www.ticketmaster.
com>.
5. See First Amended Complaint, Ticketmaster Corp. v. Mircrosoft Corp.,
CV 97-3055 RAP (C.D. Cal. filed Apr. 28, 1997) <http://www.ljx.com/LJXfiles
/ticketmaster/complaint.html> [hereinafter Ticketmaster Complaint].
6. See KIERSTEN CONNER-SAX & ED KROL, THE WHOLE INTERNET: THE
NEXT GENERATION 4 (1999).
7. See id. at 107. “The World Wide Web, or WWW, is the most popular,
powerful, and easily navigable portion of the Internet.” Id.
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1980s, the U.S. National Science Foundation extended Internet
access to researchers at universities and colleges throughout
8
the country. Until the late eighties, Internet use consisted
only of communication through e-mail messages or
9
Tim Berners-Lee then revolutionized the
newsgroups.
10
Internet by inventing the hyperlink, and the World Wide Web
11
was born.
Hyperlinks connect documents on the Internet by
providing users viewing one Web page direct access to other
Web pages. A hyperlink usually appears on an electronic
document as underlined line of colored text or graphic image.
When a user clicks on the hyperlink with a mouse pointer
another electronic document, the “Web page,” opens. Host
computers store Web pages and users explore the Internet
12
using hyperlinks to link Web page to Web page.
13
14
Users often use “search engines” such as Yahoo!, Google,
15
16
Infoseek and Ask Jeeves
to locate Web sites containing
specific information. Search engines act as databases for
17
When user types in
information contained on Web sites.
keywords regarding the information or specific type of Web site
she is looking for, the search engine provides a list of possible
links, or “addresses,” which normally appear as a hypertext
links.
By clicking on the particular address, the user’s
computer displays the contents of the chosen site.
Each Web page has an address, or Universal Resource
8. See id. at 5.
9. See id.
10. See id. at 6.
11. See Kara Beal, Comment, The Potential Liability of Linking on the
Internet: An Examination of Possible Legal Solutions, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REV. 703,
705 (1998). Public servers became available in 1993, and open specifications
allow the general public to create Web pages. Ever since the public acquired
unlimited access to the Internet, the number of Web sites has been increasing
dramatically. Approximately 500 Web sites existed in October of 1993. Six
years later over two million sites had been created. See CONNER-SAX & KROL,
supra note 6, at 107.
12. See CONNER-SAX & KROL, supra note 6, at 107. Individuals connect to
the Internet by connecting to a local Internet Service Provider (ISP). See id.
Using the telephone line, personal computers link to the server, which allows
access to information stored on all the computers joined together on the Web.
See id.
13. See supra note 1.
14. See Google (visited April 10, 2001) <http://www.google.com>.
15. See Infoseek (visited April 10, 2001) <http://www.infoseek.com>.
16. See Ask Jeeves (visited April 10, 2001) <http://www.askjeeves.com>.
17. See CONNER-SAX & KROL, supra note 6, at 414.
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Locator code (“URL”), normally beginning with “http://www.”
The address appears across the top of the screen in the
“location” bar. By looking at the location bar, a user can
identify the source of the site she is viewing. If a user knows
the address of the site she wishes to view, she can type it in the
location bar directly and avoid using a search engine.
Web pages, each one an individual work of authorship,
contain mainly text and graphics, but may also contain audio
and video elements.
Owners construct Web sites using
19
Hypertext Markup Language (“HTML”). Some sites contain
20
multiple pages and the introductory page, or “home page,”
acts as a welcome page and a guide to the information
21
contained on pages “deeper” in the site. Generally, a user who
clicks on links on the home page can connect to other pages
within the site; however, each new page has its own Internet
address, and can be accessed without first entering the site’s
22
Web
home page by directly typing the “internal” address.
pages also often contain links to other related sites. By
entering one site of interest, the user may then continue to
“surf the Web” and enter an infinite number of other sites
18. See Shelby Clark, Note, What a Tangled Web We Weave, When First
We Practice to Deceive: Frames, Hyperlinks, Metatags and Unfair Competition
on the World Wide Web, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1333, 1335 (1999).
19. See CONNER-SAX & KROL, supra note 6, at 298. The instructions for
the Web page design do not appear on the computer screen, but direct the
browser how to display text, images, and other media aspects of the page. See
id. Using HTML, a designer can make her Web page interactive through links
to other HTML documents. See id.
20. See Clark, supra note 18, at 1358 n.11. Commercial Web sites often
contain multiple pages. See id. In a commercial site, the home page acts not
only as a guide for the rest of the site, but also may contain disclaimer and
legal information as well as advertising. See id. Users view this advertising
when entering the Web site through the home page, creating revenue. See id.
21. See Beal, supra note 11, at 707.
22. See id. Pages other than the home page of a Web site are often
described as “internal” pages, located “beyond” the primary page. See id.
However, each page is located at its own URL, stored and organized in a nonlinear fashion. See CONNER-SAX & KROL, supra note 6, at 107 (“The web does
not imply a hierarchical tree, which is the structure of most books, nor a
simple ordered list. In essence, it allows many possible relations between any
individual document and others . . . regardless of where the document is
located.”). See also Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual
Property and the National Information Infrastructure 13 (1995), reprinted at
Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure (last
modified Nov. 15, 1995) <http:// www.upsto.gov/Web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/>
[hereinafter “White Paper”] (“While conceptualization helps to put in material
terms what is considered rather abstract, activity on the Internet takes place
neither in outerspace nor in parallel, virtual locations.”).

2001]

SURFING THE WEB FOR COPYRIGHT LAW

77

through the hyperlinks provided, without knowing or searching
23
for the addresses.
24
A user may link functions in one of three ways.
Hypertext Reference links (“HREF”) direct the browser to
display the content of another Web site by retrieving the new
address, which then replaces the address of the first site in the
25
location box. “IMG” links instruct a browser to display images
or text from another Web site without leaving the original
26
27
IMG linking can be accomplished by “framing” or
site.
28
“inlining.” Proxy server links display contents of a Web site to
29
which the user has already linked, by storing or “caching” the
contents of the site on the user’s computer, making it available

23. See Beal, supra note 11, at 739 n.32. Linking usually occurs without
the knowledge of the owner of the linked to site. If a site owner wants to find
out what other sites contain a link to hers, she can visit
<http://altavista.digital.com>. See id. Typing “LINK: [owner’s URL address]
generates a list describing where all the links to her site come from. See id.
24. See Peggy Miller, Advertising Law in the New Media Age, 775 PLI
Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. A0-002M 505, 507
(1997).
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See Charlton D. Rose, Sharky’s Netscape Frames Tutorial Lesson 1:
Laying Out Frames (visited April 10, 2001) <http://www.sharkysoft.com/
tutorials/frames/1/.htm>. While HREF links display only one Web page at a
time, framing allows the user to view multiple pages on the same screen. See
id. A narrow vertical frame containing a list of links to the Web site’s internal
pages often appears on one side of a Web site’s home page. See id. If a user
clicks on a link, the internal page is retrieved in the main frame and the link
list remains displayed in the vertical side bar. See id. Frames can also be
used to display information simultaneously for comparison. See id. The user
can interact with only one frame at a time, as each still exists as an
independent document. See id. Furthermore, displaying linked to information
in a frame allows the original site to continue to display bordering advertising
information. See id.
28. See Brian Wassom, Copyright Implications of “Unconventional
Linking” on the World Wide Web: Framing, Deep Linking and Inlining, 49
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 181, 193 (1998). Inlining occurs when a Web page
designer incorporates a graphic file from another site into her own page. See
id. When a user retrieves the page, specific HTML language instructs the
browser to copy an image from another page on the server and incorporate the
image onto the displayed page. See id. The graphic image usually appears in
a small box outlined in bold color. See id. Unlike in the case of HREF links,
nothing identifies the source of the inlined graphic. See id. Unless the user
deconstructs the HTML coding of the page or the creator alerts the user, the
user does not know where the individual graphic came from. See id. See also
supra note 19.
29. See Miller, supra note 24, at 507.
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30

for rapid retrieval. In each case, the content of the Web site to
be viewed must be loaded into the random access memory
(RAM) of the user’s computer before it can be displayed on the
31
screen.
According to the court in ACLU v. Reno, “[t]he power of the
Web stems from the ability of a link to point to any document,
32
regardless of its status or physical location.” The practice of
linking developed within the culture of free accessibility to the
33
34
Web and, until recently, remained largely unquestioned.
While hyperlinks between Web sites create limitless
accessibility integral to the functioning of the Web and
augment the ease with which a user may locate information,
35
competition for popularity and advertising revenue has
increased Web site owner concern about when and how other
36
Myriad legal issues arise when
sites link to theirs.
challenging the use of hypertext links. To date, copyright
claims on the Internet remain an unsettled and widely
37
disputed area of law.
30. See Beal, supra note 11, at 708. The image of the Web page remains
in the user’s computer’s RAM while the user views the page. See id. Web
browser software also stores a copy of the site, or caches it, on the computer’s
hard drive for a limited time. See id. The cache can store only a limited
number of sites; as the user visits additional sites, the cache deletes the oldest
sites and saves the more recently visited. See id. If the user revisits a site
while it is stored in the cache, the browser retrieves the information much
more quickly from the hard drive than it would by reloading the site from the
Internet. See id.
31. See Miller, supra note 24, at 507.
32. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 837 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 117 S. Ct.
2329 (1997).
33. See supra note 11.
34. See supra note 5.
35. See Beal, supra note 11, at 708-09. Owners of Web sites requiring
financial support usually charge advertisers, rather than site users, to
generate funding. See id. at 709. The site owner places the advertiser’s logo
on a Web page, and every time a user visits the page the advertiser must pay
the owner a set amount, or per-hit fee. See id.
36. See Robert A. Bourque & Kelly L. Konrad, The Tangled Web: First
Wave of Internet Cases Provides More Questions Than Answers, 8 No. 11 J.
PROPRIETARY RTS. 2, (publication page numbers not available) (1996) (“While
hyperlinks exist most obviously to provide the Internet user with handy,
efficient cross-references to relevant topics of interest, they also have great
commercial potential.”).
37. Upon hearing of the settlement ending Ticketmaster’s case against
Microsoft, described below at Part II.E., Jeffrey Kuester, Internet law
specialist and partner at Thomas, Kayden, Horstemeyer & Risley, responded,
“[i]’m sure it’s the best interest of the parties, but for the purpose of providing
meaningful guidance to the Internet community, this is the worst news I’ve
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II. COPYRIGHT LAW ONLINE
In recent years, the scope of basic copyright law in the
United States has been expanding through regulation and
judicial interpretation to encompass unforeseen developments
38
in communication technology. Current jurisprudence employs
the fundamentals of copyright law and the exclusive rights it
confers, the elements of an infringing action, and the elements
39
of the fair use defense in the Internet context.
A.

FUNDAMENTALS OF COPYRIGHT LAW

Article I of the U.S. Constitution contemplates the
existence of a body of law “to promote the Progress of Science
40
The Copyright Act of 1976 (“Act”)
and useful Arts.”
establishes a system of copyright protection in the United
States. Protection exists for all “original works of authorship
41
fixed in any tangible medium of expression,” in an effort to
encourage creation of literary, artistic and technological works,
and to reward authors for their work. However, copyright law
acts as a balance between individual protections and the public
42
interest in use and dissemination of creative works.
The Act has been amended several times, often in response
43
to the developments of advancing technology. As technology
continues to develop, new and unforeseen situations demand
that courts interpret and apply copyright laws in an equitable
heard all day. . . .We were hoping to hear some good, broad, general language
from the court. . . . Now, do we know if deep linking is bad? Is linking to a
main home page O.K.? Is it just not O.K. to link? We don’t know.” See Bob
Tedeschi, Ticketmaster and Microsoft Settle Suit on Internet Linking, N.Y.
Times (Feb. 15, 1999) <http://nytimes.qpass.com/qpass-archives>.
38. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 911 (2d ed. 2000).
39. See id. at 911- 1007 (applying copyright law to computer technology).
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
41. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
42. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 38, at 352.
43. See id. at 345-48 (describing the history of copyright law from its
origin in 1556 to the present). Congress modified the Act in 1980 to
incorporate computer programs, in 1992 to address digital audio recordings,
and in 1998 to clarify application in online contexts. See id. See also Sony
Corp. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984) (“From its beginning,
the law of copyright has developed in response to significant changes in
technology.”).
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manner; they must continue to protect the author’s rights and
provide incentives for creation, and at the same time protect
the public’s interest in the dissemination of information as
44
Recently, Congress
communication technology explodes.
enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”),
addressing the application of copyright law to online
45
technology.
B. EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS UNDER COPYRIGHT LAW
Current copyright law expressly confers six rights to a
46
copyright owner.
Section 106 conveys exclusive rights to
47
48
reproduce the work, create derivative works, distribute
49
50
copies of the work, perform the work publicly, display the
51
work publicly, and perform sound recordings by means of
52
digital audio transmission.
Like other property rights,
copyright owners may divide their bundle of rights through
53
licensing, sale, and other means of alienation. While violation
of any of these rights may constitute infringement, hyperlinks
are most likely to implicate the right to reproduce work, the
right to create derivative works, the right to distribute copies of
the work, and the right to display the work publicly.

44. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 38, at 911.
45. See The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112
Stat. 2860 (1998), codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512. The DMCA “implements two
important international treaties of the World Intellectual Property
Organization,” modifies the application of copyright law to the Internet, and
“outlaws manufacture of devices or software designed to circumvent protective
security measures created for the Internet and other electronic environments.”
Carolyn Andrepont, Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 9 No. 11 DEPAUL-LCA
J. ART & ENT. L. 397, 398-399 (1999).
46. 2 MELVIN B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
8.01[A] at 8-14 (1963).
47. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2001).
48. See id. § 106(2) (2001).
49. See id. § 106(3) (2001).
50. See id. § 106(4) (2001).
51. See id. § 106(5) (2001).
52. See id. § 106(6) (2001).
53. See Wassom, supra note 28, at 194-95.
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The Right to Reproduce the Work

The right to reproduce a work is the most fundamental
54
right granted by copyright law. Section 106(1) grants a broad
right that prevents others from making both exact copies and
55
“substantially similar” reproductions.
Section 101 defines
56
“copies” as “material objects . . . in which work is fixed . . .”
Although the law prohibits copying, it does not prohibit
independent creation. A copyright owner possesses rights to
the original expression, not the facts, which are considered
57
According to the legislative history of §106,
public domain.
reproducing the entire work or any substantial part, exactly or
by imitation, constitutes infringement “as long as the author’s
‘expression’ rather [than] merely the author’s ‘ideas’ are
58
taken.”
In the online context, the reproduction right is arguably
implicated every time an image is reproduced either in a
central server or in a user’s computer. Very little case law
exists concerning “the exclusive right of reproduction of works
in the context of computer memory” and most of them concern
59
In 1993, the Court of Appeals for the
computer software.
Ninth Circuit held that “since . . . the copy created in the RAM
can be ‘perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated’, . . .
the loading of software into the RAM creates a copy under the
60
However, when browsing the Internet, a
Copyright Act.”
“copy” exists on the computer screen only as long as the user
views the page, and on the computer’s hard drive only until the
61
cache fills and the earliest viewed sites are erased. Since the
image usually does not even remain in the computer’s memory
62
until the computer is turned off, as in MAI Sys. v. Peak, such

54. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 38, at 432.
55. See id. at 433.
56. 17 U.S.C § 101 (2001).
57. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 38, at 433.
58. See id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 61
(1976)).
59. See Bruce Keller, Internet and Online Law: Copyright, 610 PLI
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook
Series No. G0-00D6 169, 212 (2000).
60. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir.
1993), cert. dismissed 510 U.S. 1033 (1994).
61. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 60 and accompanying text; MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d at
519.
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use is arguably not “fixed” as required by the statutory
63
definition. Although a number of courts agreed with the MAI
64
65
66
Sys. holding, prior case law, Congressional intent, most
67
68
commentators,
and intuition
reject this decision.
Furthermore, Section 117 of the Act, enacted in 1980, permits
users of computer programs to make certain copies without
69
implicating the copyright holder’s reproduction rights.
63. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2001). The statute states that “a work is ‘fixed’ in
a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment is a copy or
phonorecord . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than a
transitory duration.” Id.
64. See, e.g., Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330,
1335 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that loading operating system software into a
computer’s RAM is copying for the purposes of the Act); Stenograph L.L.C. v.
Bossard Associates, Inc., 144 F.3d 96, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that
loading software from a permanent storage medium to a computer’s RAM by
“booting up” causes a copy to be made); Tiffany Design, Inc. v. Reno-Tahoe
Specialty, Inc., 55 F. Supp.2d 1113, 1119 (D. Nev. 1999) (holding that scanning
a photograph into a computer’s RAM violates the reproduction right).
65. See Apple Computer v. Formula Int’l. Inc., 594 F. Supp. 617, 621-22
(C.D. Cal. 1984) (indicating that copies stored in RAM, unlike those loaded in
ROM, were only “temporary”).
66. The House Report on the 1976 Act states that “the definition of
‘fixation’ would exclude from the concept purely evanescent or transient
reproductions such as those captured momentarily in the ‘memory’ of a
computer.” H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1976).
67. See, e.g., MERGES ET AL., supra note 42, at 968; Niva Elkin-Koren,
Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information Superhighway: The
Case Against Copyright Liability of Internet Providers, 13 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 345, 381-382 (1995); Michael E. Johnson, Note, The Uncertain
Future of Computer Software Users’ Rights in the Aftermath of MAI Systems,
44 DUKE L.J. 327 (1994); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and
Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1280 n.184 (1995); Katrine
Levin, Note, MAI v. Peak: Should Loading Operating System Software into
RAM Constitute Copyright Infringement?, 24 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 649
(1994); Jessica Litmas, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 29, 41-42 (1994); Carol G. Stovsky, Note, MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak
Computer, Inc.: Using Copyright Law to Prevent Unauthorized Use of
Computer Software, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 593 (1995).
68. Under MAI, every use of a computer involves making copies. See
MERGES ET AL., supra note 38, at 968. It would be impossible for a computer
to read and implement a program without making a copy; such application of
copyright law, while protecting a copyright owner’s interest, obliterates the
public’s interest in dissemination and use of the work. See id. (“While you can
‘use’ a book without making a copy, under MAI any use of a computer
program- even turning the computer on- necessarily implicates the copyright
laws.”).
69. See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2001). Section 117 states that “it is not an
infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make. . .
another copy. . . provided: (1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as
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The Right to Create Derivative Works

A copyright owner also has the exclusive right to prepare
70
derivative works. In order to be considered a derivative work,
the new work must contain an element of originality and be
71
made by, or with the permission of, the true copyright owner.
Furthermore, a derivative work must add a new expressive
element to the original work and serve markets that differ from
72
the market in which the original work was introduced. The
level of originality required in the new work for the courts to
73
consider it a derivative work is more than “merely trivial.”
Infringement occurs when a third party “recast[s], transform[s]
74
or adapt[s]” a work without the authorization of the copyright
owner.
According to the Fourth Annual Internet Law Institute,
simply digitizing a work does not create a derivative work, as
75
“such techniques are essentially techniques of copying.” The
courts have addressed the question, however, of whether
modification of an existing digital work by simply adding a new

an essential step in the utilization of the computer program. . . or (2) that such
new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all archival
copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the computer
program should cease to be rightful.” Id. The Congressional intention in
enacting § 117 “seems to be to allow copies such as those made in MAI v.
Peak.” MERGERS ET AL., supra note 38, at 969. Title III of the DMCA altered
this provision to expressly exempt from liability the owner or lessee of a
computer to make a copy of a computer program for purposes of maintaining
or repairing computer hardware only. See Keller, supra note 59, at 213.
70. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2001). Section 101 of the Act defines a
“derivative work” as “a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such
as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion
picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation,
or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A
work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaboration, or other
modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a
‘derivative work’.” 17 U.S.C. §101 (2001).
71. See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2001).
72. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc. 704 F.2d 1009, 1013-14 (7th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 923 (1983).
73. Jeffrey R. Kuester & Peter A. Nieves, Hyperlinks, Frames and MetaTags: An Intellectual Property Analysis, 38 IDEA 243, 254 (1998) (“The level of
originality required does vary among the United States Courts of Appeals,
leading to uncertainty as to how the law will apply to the new medium of the
Web.”).
74. Id.
75. Keller, supra note 59, at 214.
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component to that work creates a derivative work. The court
in Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., determined that adding
a Artic-manufactured computer chip, which was used to speed
up an arcade video game manufactured by Midway, infringed
77
on Midway’s copyright by creating a derivative work. On the
contrary, the court in Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of
78
Am., ruled that the Game Genie, a computer game add-on
that altered characteristics of games played on a home video
game unit, does not infringe, as it does not incorporate any part
79
The Galoob court distinguished the
of the original work.
Game Genie from Artic’s chip; noting that Game Genie involved
no direct copying from a computer’s ROM and that it is used in
80
a private, non-commercial setting. In dicta, the Galoob court
stated that “derivative works should not encompass works
81
whose sole purpose is to enhance the underlying work.”
3.

The Right to Distribute Copies of the Work

Another right that may arise in the Internet context is the
right of distribution. Section 106(3) grants the copyright owner
the right to distribute, through sale or other means, original
82
and subsequent copies of the copyrighted work. Infringement
of the distribution right requires that a third party actually
83
A distributor of
disseminate copies of the original work.
unauthorized copies may be liable for copyright infringement
84
even if she did not make the copies herself.
In the Internet context, disseminating a document on the
Web may implicate the distribution right. Link creators have
been held liable for infringement if the link is used to retrieve a

76. See MERGERS ET AL., supra note 38, at 976-1007 (discussing fair use
and derivative works as applied to computer software.)
77. See Midway Mfg. Co., 704 F.2d at 1013.
78. See Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir.
1992).
79. See id. at 968 .
80. See id. at 969.
81. Matt Jackson, Linking Copyright to Homepages, 49 FED. COMM. L.J.
731, 748 (1997). See also Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 964 F.2d at 659 (“The Game
Genie is useless by itself, it can only enhance, and cannot duplicate or recast, a
Nintendo game’s output.”).
82. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2001).
83. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 46, § 8.11[A], at 8-149.
84. See MERGER ET AL., supra note 38, at 470.
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85

Web site that distributes infringing copies of works.
The
distribution right, however, has been interpreted to apply to
“material objects, which are arguably distinct from the signals
86
sent in transmissions.” Courts have been inconsistent in the
application of the statutory right to public distribution with
87
The Working Group on
regard to electronic transmissions.
Intellectual Property Rights of the United States addressed
this uncertainty and proposed that works distributed
electronically should be treated no differently from work
88
Despite these recommendations, the
distributed physically.
DMCA did not “change the law with respect to many
transmissions that implicate the exclusive distribution rights of
89
copyright owners,” as it mandates a licensing scheme relating
90
specifically to online transmissions of sound recordings only.
4.

The Right to Display the Work Publicly

The fourth right that hyperlinks may arguably implicate is
the exclusive right of public display. Section 101 defines
“display” as “to show a copy of it, either directly or by means of
film, slide, television image, or any other device or process or,
in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to
91
show individual images nonsequentially.” Such display must
occur:
at a place open to the public or at any place where a
substantial number of persons outside of a normal
circle of family and its social acquaintances is

85. See Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75
F.Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Utah 2000) (holding that providing links to a Web site
that contains infringing copies of the Mormon Church handbook constitutes
contributory infringement).
86. Keller, supra note 59, at 227 n.12.
87. See Agee v. Paramount Comm. Inc., 59 F.3d 317, 324-25 (2d Cir. 1995)
(holding that a satellite transmission of sound recordings does not constitute
distribution) and Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 932-33
(N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that the uploading and downloading of software
infringes reproduction right, with no finding made with respect to public
distribution rights). But see Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp.
1552, 1556 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (holding that operators of an Internet bulletin
board service from which copyrighted pictures were viewed and downloaded
constitutes infringement of public distribution rights).
88. See White Paper, supra note 22, at 213-17.
89. Keller, supra note 59, at 217.
90. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 112, 114 (2001).
91. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2001).
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gathered; or (2) to transmit or otherwise
communicate. . . to a place specified by clause (1) or to
92
the public, by means of any device or process.
Clause (2) covers all broadcasts or transmissions, even if
all possible recipients do not view the work, or do so
93
individually, in the privacy of their own home.
Like infringement of the right to distribution, infringement
of the right to public display may occur in the absence of
94
copying the work. Posting and viewing documents on the
Internet may involve copyright liability for violation of an
owner’s exclusive display right.
Like many aspects of
potentially infringing situations on the Web, the “significance
of the right of public display . . . to the online environment has
95
not been addressed in detail in the decisional law to date.”
The “White Paper” declares that browsing the Web and viewing
works online constitutes a public display, but offers no
96
explanation for its decision. According to the Fourth Annual
Internet Law Institute, the assumption underlying the White
Paper’s determination “is that all browsing requires copying in
RAM, which fixation, it concludes, is a reproduction under
97
current case law.”
C. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
A claim of copyright infringement can be brought under 17
98
U.S.C. § 501.
To establish direct infringement, a plaintiff
must prove ownership of a valid copyright, copying by the
99
A plaintiff can
defendant, and improper misappropriation.
92. Id.
93. Id. The transmission of a work constitutes public display “whether
the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display
receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at
different times.” Id.
94. See MERGER ET AL., supra note 38, at 478.
95. Keller, supra note 59, at 226.
96. See White Paper, supra note 22, at 71.
97. Keller, supra note 59, at 227 n.52. See also supra Part I.B.1
(discussing the viability of claims that loading information into a computer’s
RAM creates a copy within the meaning of the Act) and Part II.B.1 (discussing
fixation requirement as an element of “copying”).
98. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2001). The section states in part, “[a]nyone
who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by
sections 106 through 121 . . . is an infringer of the copyright or right of the
author.” Id.
99. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d. Cir. 1946).
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establish the copying element through showings of defendant’s
100
access to the original work, or that the “two works are so
strikingly similar as to preclude the possibility of independent
101
creation.” A plaintiff can establish improper appropriation by
102
showing “substantial similarities” in the two works.
The
defendant must have interfered with one of the plaintiff’s rights
granted by §106 in order for the plaintiff to succeed on an
103
Remedies for infringement liability
infringement claim.
include “an injunction, the impounding and disposal of
infringing articles, damages and profits, court costs and
attorney’s fees, and even criminal sanctions against the
104
infringer.”
In order to find contributory infringement damaging, the
court first must find that the copyright owner’s rights have
105
Personal conduct that furthers, or is
been directly infringed.
part of, a copyright infringement constitutes contributory
infringement, as does supplying machinery or good that provide
106
Such infringement occurs when
the means for infringement.
“one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces,
causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of
107
another.”
D. FAIR USE DEFENSE TO COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
Limitations exist on the exclusive rights afforded to
copyright owners in 17 U.S.C. § 106.
Under § 107, “the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not
108
The Copyright Act describes
infringement of copyright.”
certain purposes for which reproducing copies does not
100. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 46, § 13.01[B], at 13-10.
101. Fergusen v. Nat’l Board. Co., Inc., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978).
102. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 46, § 13.03[A], at 13-27.
Copying that is negligible in quantity but substantial in quality may
nonetheless constitute substantial similarity. Id.
103. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361
(1991).
104. Rosaleen P. Morris, Note, Be Careful to Whom You Link: How the
Internet Practices of Hyperlinking and Framing Pose New Challenges to
Established Trademark and Copyright Law, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 247, 277 (1998).
105. See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 46, § 12.04[A][3][a], at 12-82 to
12-84.
106. See id.
107. Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443
F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
108. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2001).
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109

constitute infringement
and enumerates four factors the
court should consider in determining fair use: the purpose and
110
111
character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work,
the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
112
the copyrighted work as a whole, and the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
113
The Copyright Acts also lists potential fair uses and
work.
the factors to be considered in determining fair use are
114
The Copyright Act also
“illustrative rather than exhaustive.”
provides that no one factor should be considered definitive;
115
rather, the court should balance all four in equity.
1.

The Purpose and Character of Use

The first factor to consider in determining the validity of a
fair use defense to copyright infringement examines the
116
A court must consider
purpose of the use of the copied work.
not only whether the defendant used the work for a commercial
117
or nonprofit purpose, but also whether the user stands to
profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without
118
The propriety of the defendant’s
paying the customary price.
119
conduct also merits consideration, as does whether implied

109. See id. The statute contemplates “purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship, or research, is not infringement of copyright.” Id.
110. See id. § 107(1).
111. See id. § 107(2).
112. See id. § 107(3).
113. See id. § 107(4).
114. MERGES ET AL., supra note 42, at 490. According to the House Report,
both lists serve to “offer some guidance” in judicial determination of a fair use
defense. See id. (quoting H.R. No. 9401476, at 66 (1976)).
115. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 46, § 13.05[A], at 13-152 to 13155.
116. See 17 U.S.C § 107(1) (2001).
117. See id. Section 107 states that the character of the use includes
“whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes.” Id.
118. See Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 566-68
(1985).
119. See id. at 562. See also 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 46, §
13.05[A][1][d], at 13-167 to 13-170, and Jonathan B. Ko, Para-Sites: The Case
for Hyperlinking as Copyright Infringement, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 361, 377
(“Intuitively, a use made in bad faith is inconsistent with this privilege
because an assumption of good faith and fair dealing underlies fair use.”).
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120

consent justifies the use.
2.

The Nature of the Copyrighted Work

The nature of the copyrighted work is the second
consideration. The necessity for an informed society, dictates
that the public should have greater access to certain public
121
Thus, courts recognize a greater need to
works than others.
122
disseminate factual works than fiction.
Whether the author
has published the work is a critical component of the
consideration, since the author’s right to decide when and
123
where her work becomes public may outweigh the defense.
Courts will also consider the copyright holder’s interest in
124
confidentiality and creative control of the work.
3.

The Amount and Substantiality of the Work Used

The third factor listed for consideration in U.S.C.§107 is
the amount of the work copied. Courts will consider not only
the portion of the original work copied in relation to the
original work as a whole constitutes an important
consideration, but also the proportion of allegedly infringing
125
If the portion copied is
work the copied material comprises.
substantially larger than the portion necessary to complete the
purpose of the defendant’s work, the amount copied will weigh
126
The factor contemplates not
against a finding of fair use.
only how much of the original work was copied but also the
127
import of that aspect of the work.
4.

The Effect on Market Value

The fourth factor for consideration is the effect of the use
128
The
upon the market for or value of the copyrighted work.
120.
121.
13-171.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 551.
See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 46, § 13.05[A][2][a], at 13-170 to
See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547-48.
See id. at 555.
See id. at 564.
See id. at 565-66.
See id. at 564-65.
See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 46, § 13.05 [A][3], at 13-180.
See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2001).
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Supreme Court has indicated that this factor serves as
129
“undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”
The fair use defense is limited to copying by others that which
does not materially impair the marketability of the allegedly
130
A plaintiff may negate the fair use defense by
copied work.
showing that should the challenged use become widespread, “it
would adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted
131
Furthermore, the court may consider not only the
work.”
harm incurred in the market for the original work but also
132
harm to the market for derivative works.
The fair use defense, in all contexts, “is a highly
133
contentious area of law” and the balancing of the four factors
134
in each case-by-case analysis remains extremely fact-specific.
E. TICKETMASTER V. MICROSOFT: A CASE FOR ONLINE
COPYRIGHT LIABILITY?
135

Recently, Ticketmaster objected to “deep links”
connecting to the ticket purchase order page of its Web site.
136
The first legal dispute arose in April of 1997, after Microsoft
created a series of Web sites as online travel guides to certain
137
One site, called Seattle
cities throughout the world.

129. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556.
130. See id. at 568.
131. See id. (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 451, 104 S.Ct. 774, 793 (1984)).
132. See id. at 568 (stating that fair use analysis “must take account not
only of harm to the original but also harm to the market for derivative
works”).
133. Keller, supra note 59, at 203.
134. See id. at 231. Depending on the combination and strength of
arguments for each factor, a fair use defense may apply to hyperlinking Web
pages on the Internet. See id. For example, “when the reproduction,
performance or display is made only of a fragment of a work, for a transitory
period, for noncommercial use and when no downloading occurs, the argument
that browsing is a fair use would seem particularly strong.” Id.
135. Deep linking occurs when a hypertext link connects to an internal
page of another Web site, rather than to the site’s home page. See Beal, supra
note 11, at 711. Although the user is aware the link is taking place, she may
be unaware that she is linking to an entirely new site rather than an internal
page of the original site. See id. Some Web site owners, especially owners of
commercial sites, feel that deep links “defeat a Web site’s intended method of
navigation.” Wassom, supra note 28, at 192.
136. See supra note 5.
137. See id. Other cities include Washington, D.C., Boston, and San
Francisco.
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138

Sidewalk,
included descriptions of various entertainment
events in Seattle and provided a hypertext link to the
Ticketmaster Web page. Instead of linking to Ticketmaster’s
139
home page, clicking on the hypertext link transferred the
user directly to the page on which the user enters a credit card
140
number to actually purchase tickets for the particular event.
In this manner, a visitor to the Seattle Sidewalk page could
purchase tickets from Ticketmaster without visiting
Ticketmaster’s home page and thus avoid exposure to third141
party advertising.
As a first attempt to prevent Seattle Sidewalk’s link,
Ticketmaster’s claim alleged unfair competition and trademark
infringement; it did not include copyright infringement claims
142
After Microsoft filed a
and did not mention deep linking.
counterclaim seeking declaratory judgment as to the legality of
143
Ticketmaster amended its complaint to
hyperlinking
144
specifically address deep linking as the infringing activity.
Unfortunately, rather than force the court to determine
whether hyperlinks may be created without fear of liability in
order to “remove any chill from the free workings of the
145
146
Internet,” the first Ticketmaster case settled.
138. See supra note 2.
139. See Ticketmaster (visited April 10, 2001) <http://www.ticketmaster.
com>.
140. See Ticketmaster Complaint, supra note 5. See also Beal, supra note
11, at 713 (“When the user arrived at Ticketmaster’s page through the link
from Seattle Sidewalk, the Ticketmaster [page’s] URL was displayed, and the
look and feel of the site were different from Seattle Sidewalk.”).
141. See id.
142. See Ticketmaster Complaint, supra note 5.
143. See Kuester & Nieves, supra note 73, at 263. See also Answer to First
Amended Complaint, Ticketmaster Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., CV 97-3055 RAP
(C.D.
Cal.
Filed
Apr.
28,
1997)
(visited
April
16,
2001)
<http://www.ljx.com/LJXfiles/ticketmaster/answer.html>
[hereinafter
Microsoft Answer].
144. See Ticketmaster Complaint, supra note 5 (“Some of Seattle
Sidewalk’s links have circumvented the beginning pages of Ticketmaster’s
Web site, which display advertisements, products and services of entities with
which Ticketmaster contracts, and have liked directly to subsidiary pages of
the Web site.”). By narrowing the claim to infringement by use of deep links,
Ticketmaster acknowledges hyperlinks to its home page may not create a
cause of action. See id.
145. Kuester & Nieves, supra note 73, at 263 (quoting Microsoft Answer,
supra note 143).
146. See Tedeschi, supra note 37. Although the parties did not disclose the
settlement terms, the Seattle Sidewalk site changed it’s link to connect to
Ticketmaster’s home page. See id. It appears from the agreement that
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In a subsequent claim against Tickets.com filed in July of
147
1999,
Ticketmaster chose to include claims of copyright
148
infringement based on the reproduction right. In conjunction
with other cases that have recently arisen claiming copyright
149
Ticketmaster’s
addition
of
copyright
infringement,
infringement to its legal complaint represents the belief that
hypertext linking, especially deep linking, constitutes a viable
claim of copyright infringement.
Ticketmaster’s suit against Microsoft pertained to a deep
150
Since copyright protects ideas
link to an order form page.
151
and expression, not facts and forms, the specific page in
152
question may not even contain copyrightable material.
Many, indeed most, Web pages do contain copyrightable
material, including other pages in Ticketmaster’s site.
Unfortunately, “the on-line industry remains without legal
guidelines on the practice of so-called deep linking, of which
153
Microsoft was by no means the only practitioner.”

Ticketmaster was satisfied as long as no deep linking occurred, although no
precedent-setting decision was reached by the court. See id.
147. See Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Ticketmaster Corp.
v. Tickets.com, WL 1887522 at * 1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000). Although the
California Central District Court found that hypertext linking by itself does
not create copies, and does not constitute copyright infringement, see id., the
Utah District Court found contributory infringement for creating links to site
containing a church document. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
148. See Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint,
Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, WL 525390 at *2 (C.D. Cal. March 27,
2000) (“The motion to dismiss the first claim (copyright infringement) is
denied because the complaint alleges actual copying.”).
149. See, e.g., What the Judge said in the Shetland Times Case, SHETLAND
NEWS (Oct. 24, 1996) <http://www.shetland-news.co.uk/opinion.
html> (opinion granting interim interdict); Washington Post Co. v. Total
News, Inc., 97 Civ. 190 (PLK) (S.D.N.Y., complaint, filed Feb. 20, 1997); and
United Media’s Second Letter (Feb. 3. 1998) (visited April 10, 2001)
<http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~dwallach/dilbert>.
150. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
152. See Wassom, supra note 28, at 215.
153. Tedeschi, supra note 37. All of the cases mentioned in note 149 also
settled without reaching a decision on the merits. See generally Beal, supra
note 11. “There is no direct precedent for the copyright issues that arise in
these contexts, and no mention in the copyright statutes of how to apply
copyright law to the Internet.” Id. at 722.
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III. HYPERLINKS DO NOT CREATE A CASE FOR
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
If Ticketmaster had decided to raise a copyright claim in
the Microsoft suit (assuming that the linked-to page was
copyrightable), as the owner of the linked-to Web site (“owner”)
it would have had to first decide who was liable for such
infringement: the Internet Service Provider (“ISP”), the creator
of the Web site containing the contested link (“link creator”), or
the individual user browsing the Web (“user”). Although the
claims described above were actually brought against the link
creator, careful consideration of each of the actors who are
potentially liable for infringement demonstrates that the ISP,
the link creator, and the user all may likely use HREF links,
154
including deep links, without violating current copyright law.
A. A VALID COPYRIGHT CLAIM DOES NOT EXIST AGAINST THE
INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDER
A local Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) connects
155
individuals to the Internet.
While it is possible that a
plaintiff such as Ticketmaster may identify an ISP as an
infringer, it is unlikely since Title II of the DMAC, entitled the
Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation, “contains
156
Limitations on
several ‘safe harbor’ provisions for ISPs.”
liability exist in four areas: “1) transitory communication, 2)
system caching, 3) storage of information on either systems or
networks as the direction of users, and 4) information location
157
As long as the ISP falls into the categorical
tools.”
158
definition, the server may not be liable if it implements a

154. This note addresses whether or not HREF hypertext links create a
viable action for copyright infringement. It does not apply to IMG links
involving inlining or framing. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
156. Andrepont, supra note 45, at 412.
157. Id.
158. In order to qualify as a “service provider,” with regard to the
limitation on “transitory communications,” the provider must be “an entity
offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connection for the digital
online communications, . . . without modification to the content of the material
as sent or received.” Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304,
112 Stat. 2860 § 512 (1998). Qualifications with regard to the other
limitations define a provider as “a provider of online services or network
access, or the operator of facilities therefor.” Id.
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policy for terminating accounts of subscribers who repeatedly
infringe copyrights and supports technological measures used
159
to protect copyrights.
Section 512(d) specifically addresses
160
“hyperlinks, online directories, and search engines.”
The ISP
will not be held liable, regardless of actual knowledge that the
material or activity is infringing, as long as it does not directly
receive a financial benefit from infringing activity, and, if when
alerted to the infringing material, it removes or disables the
161
The Act “provides
material that is claimed to be infringing.
that a service provider will not be liable for any monetary,
injunctive or other equitable relief, as long as the listed
162
Because of safeguards specifically
conditions are met.”
created by the DMCA for ISPs, the owner would be unable to
prevail on a claim of infringement.
B. A VALID COPYRIGHT CLAIM DOES NOT EXIST AGAINST THE
LINK CREATOR
When suing for copyright infringement, the copyright
owner would most likely name the link creator as the infringing
party. The owner could file a complaint based on direct
infringement and could also assert contributory infringement,
claiming that the link created provides the means for
infringement by the user.
1.

The Link Creator Does Not Directly Infringe Any
Copyrights

In order to establish direct infringement, the court must
find copying by the defendant and improper misappropriation
163
By providing an HREF, the link creator must
of the work.
interfere with one of the owner’s statutory rights, which include
the right to reproduce the work, the right to create derivative
copies of the work, the right to distribute copies of the work, or
164
the right to distribute the work.
159. See Andrepont, supra note 45, at 413.
160. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
§ 512 (1998).
161. See Andrepont, supra note 45, at 417.
162. Id. at 415.
163. See supra Part II.C (discussing direct and contributory copyright
infringement).
164. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
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The Link Creator Does Not Directly Infringe the
Right to Reproduce the Work

The most fundamental right created by copyright law is
165
the exclusive right to reproduce one’s work. The fundamental
166
question is: Who is actually reproducing the work?
Microsoft
asserted that Ticketmaster’s complaint “is based on a
fundamental fiction. Ticketmaster creates an illusion that
Microsoft, not the Internet user, is accessing Ticketmaster’s
167
Microsoft has only placed the URL of
Web pages.”
Ticketmaster’s purchasing page on the Seattle Sidewalk Web
168
By clicking on the HREF link, the user
site as a hyperlink.
directed her computer to leave Seattle Sidewalk, connect to the
169
Ticketmaster site, and retrieve the purchase order page. The
link creator does not reproduce any part of the owner’s work, it
merely provides an interested user the Internet address of
another useful site. Moreover, the URL itself does not contain
170
expression, but only fact, which is not copyrightable material.
Therefore, the link creator’s page does not create copy of the
owner’s site and does not directly infringe on the owner’s
reproduction right.
b.

The Link Creator Does Not Directly Infringe the Right to
Create Derivative Works

The owner might claim that the link creator is modifying
the original work by creating a hypertext link to an internal
171
Since
Web page, and in doing so, creating a derivative work.
the link creator is not creating a copy of the owner’s Web page
172
as stated above, the link creator is doing nothing more than
165. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
166. The law prohibits making both copies and substantially similar
reproductions. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
167. Microsoft Answer, supra note 139, at 46.
168. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. The URL appeared in the
location bar as: <http://www.ticketmaster.com>.
169. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 57-58. Even if the URL contains the name of the Web
page, names and titles are not generally copyrightable. See id.
171. See supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
172. See supra Part III.B.1.a (explaining that the link creator does not
directly infringe copyrights because the link creator does not reproduce the
original work).
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adding a method for the user to access the owner’s Web page.
Hyperlinks may be analogized to the Game Genie created by
173
Galoob, which the court held did not create a derivative work.
Just as the Game Genie is physically attached to a Nintendo
video game, the link creator’s hypertext link “attaches,”
superficially through HTML, to the owner’s page. Both the
Game Genie and hypertext links are useless by themselves;
174
neither functions in the absence of the original work.
Furthermore, hyperlinks entail no direct copying and are used
in a private setting, two factors which were considered to be
175
By creating a hypertext
important in the Galoob decision.
link to the owner’s Web page, the link creator does not create a
derivative work.
c.

The Link Creator Does Not Directly Infringe the Right to
Distribute Copies of the Work

Copyright owners retain the right to distribute both the
176
The link
original work and subsequent copies of the work.
177
creator’s hyperlink does not create a copy of the owner’s work
and therefore possesses nothing to distribute.
However,
infringement of the distribution right does not require that the
178
The owner may
distributor make the unauthorized copies.
argue that though the user creates the copies, the link creator’s
site does the distributing. The theory that the link creator
distributes anything contains two flaws. First, it operates on
the assumption that distribution can occur before copying,
which is logically unsound; second, it confuses providing
directions with providing the actual web page contents, since
the link on the link creator’s site does nothing more than
provide the user with the address of the owner’s Web page.
The information provided by Internet hyperlinks can be
compared to information provided by telephone information
services. Using the Ticketmaster hypothetical, suppose the
user wants to purchase concert tickets by phone. She calls

173. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
177. See supra Part III.B.1.a (explaining that the link creator does not
directly infringe copyrights because the link creator does not reproduce the
original work).
178. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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Information and requests Ticketmaster’s phone number. The
operator will provide it, as long as it is listed in the city’s
directory. The user may then reach Ticketmaster either by
hanging up the phone and dialing the number or requesting
that the operator connect her directly. Here, Ticketmaster
chose to post its Web page on the Internet, just as it chose to
list its phone number in the directory. Microsoft, akin to the
Information operator, provides the URL address that the user
is looking for, then the user makes the decision whether to click
on the address directly, type it into the location bar, or ignore it
altogether. The link creator does not control whether, or by
what means, the user reaches the owner’s Web page. If the
owner would like to stop distributing its Web page, it may
remove the document from the server or otherwise protect it.
In creating the hyperlink, the link creator does not directly
infringe the owner’s right to distribute either the original work
179
or copies thereof.
d.

The Link Creator Does Not Directly Infringe the
Right to Display the Work Publicly

Suppose that while browsing the Internet, the user visits
the link creator’s Web site. With one click on the HREF link,
she suddenly finds her computer displaying a page of the
owner’s Web site. The URL of the specific page appears in the
location bar and the user is no longer “at” the link creator’s
180
Thus, the computer displays the owner’s Web page
site.
itself, not the owner’s Web page on the link creator’s site. The
link creator is not directly infringing by displaying the
copyrighted work in a public place, which is the definition of
181
public display under § 101, clause (1).
Clause (2) of the definition, however, includes transmission
182
of the work.
Even assuming that the Information
Infrastructure Task Force’s White Paper is correct in asserting

179. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. It is worth noting,
however, that if the link creator created a link to a Web page that distributed
infringing copies of copyrighted works, a case of contributory infringement
may exist. In that case the owner of the linked to site, would be the actor
liable for direct infringement, so it is unlikely that she would bring a suit
against anyone else. See id.
180. See supra Part I (describing the technical process of hyperlinking).
181. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
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183

that works viewed online constitute public displays,
the
Ticketmaster Web site transmits its Web pages to the user’s
computer at the user’s request. Ticketmaster, not Microsoft,
184
so
displays the document by placing it on the server,
Microsoft cannot be liable for direct infringement of
Ticketmaster’s public display right.
2.

The Link Creator Does Not Contributorily Infringe
Copyrights

While the link on the creator’s site does not directly
infringe the owner’s copyright, the owner may claim that the
link creator is liable for contributory infringement for providing
185
the means for others to infringe. In order to find contributory
infringement, the owner would have to prove that the link
creator knew of the infringement, the users in fact used the
link to connect to the owner’s Web page, the user was
committing direct infringement due to the hyperlink, and the
186
link substantially contributed to the direct infringement.
Returning to the Ticketmaster hypothetical, Microsoft
created the link so users could connect to Ticketmaster and
purchase tickets, so the court might assume that Microsoft
knows that users are clicking on the hyperlink, satisfying the
second requirement. Although a user may view the same Web
page by directly typing in the URL, Ticketmaster could possibly
substantially contribute to infringement, by claiming that the
link substantially contributed to the direct infringement; since
Microsoft enables at least some users to enter the Ticketmaster
site, the court might conclude that it contributes substantially
to the conduct of the linking user, albeit a difficult assertion to
prove. Ticketmaster would have to prove, however, that the
user directly infringes its rights in order to satisfy elements one
and three to prevail on a contributory infringement claim.

183. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
184. See supra Part III.B.1.c (explaining that the link creator does not
directly infringe because the link creator does not distribute copies of the
work).
185. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
186. See Keller, supra note 59, at 236. See also supra notes 105-107 and
accompanying text.
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C. A VALID COPYRIGHT CLAIM DOES NOT EXIST AGAINST THE
INTERNET USER
If linking from the link creator’s Web site to the owner’s
page constitutes direct infringement by the Internet user, the
owner would have a cause of action every time her Web page
gets a “hit” without the user normally typing the owner’s URL.
Ticketmaster, however, does not want to discourage users from
purchasing tickets online, only from purchasing tickets from
the order page via deep link, bypassing third party advertising
on the rest of the Ticketmaster site. Thus, Ticketmaster would
not have brought an action if the link had been to the home
page rather than the order page. Bringing a cause of action of
contributory infringement against the link creator, rather than
the user, Ticketmaster not only avoids alienating its target
market but also has a much better chance of confronting a
defendant with deep pockets, such as Microsoft. In order to
prevail on contributory claims, however, the owner must still
187
prove that the users directly infringe its copyright.
1.

The Internet User Does Not Directly Infringe Copyrights

The owner of a linked-to Web page is unlikely to be able to
prove that Internet users directly infringe copyrights. Even if
the court determines that the user’s computer does reproduce
the work, a user is still likely to prevail on either an implied
license or a fair use defense.
a.

The Internet User Does Not Directly Infringe the Right to
Reproduce the Work

When clicking on the HREF link on the link creator’s Web
site, the user’s computer contacts the ISP, which retrieves the
data for the owner’s URL from the user’s server and displays it
on the user’s screen. In order to display the owner’s page, it
188
If the court
must be stored in the user computer’s RAM.
considers that the RAM storage of the Web page constitutes
copying, it necessarily has determined that such storage meets
189
the “fixation” requirement of the Copyright Act, though the
187. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 59-69.
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information is normally erased from the RAM when the user
190
shuts down the computer, if not before.
The DMCA has been
interpreted to “confirm[] that a temporary copy of a copyrighted
work made automatically by a computer when browsing [the
191
Any other
Web] is not considered an infringing copy.”
interpretation would lead to the absurd result that every user
surfing the Internet directly infringes copyright law every time
she views a Web page. Thereby making every link creator
liable for contributory infringement. Without hyperlinks, the
Internet would cease to be a seamless Web of interconnected
192
documents, but rather would be reduced to a complicated
array of isolated works, accessible only to those who know the
specific URL of the site they would like to view.
b.

The Internet User Does Not Directly Infringe the Right to
Create Derivative Works

By linking to the owner’s Web page, an Internet user does
not create a derivative work. She views the owner’s page on
her computer screen, as the owner has displayed it on the Web,
193
Just as the
without adding any original expressive element.
link creator does not directly infringe the right to create a
194
the user does not violate the owner’s
derivative work,
exclusive right to create derivative works simply because she
reaches the site through a hyperlink.
c.

The Internet User Does Not Directly Infringe the Right to
Distribute Copies of the Work

The only way the user could violate the right to distribute
copies of the owner’s work is by printing the Web page and
195
The same reasoning applies as
distributing it physically.
used above with regard to the link creator, that viewing the
Web page does not create the copy, but rather subsequent
190. See id.
191. Roarty, supra note 148, at 1039 (quoting Karen S. Frank, Cable
Online Liability in Cable Television Law 1999, 245, 265 [PLI]).
192. See supra Part I (describing how the Internet functions).
193. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
194. See supra Part III.B.1.a (explaining that the link creator does not
directly infringe copyrights because the link creator does not reproduce the
original work).
195. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
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actions of the user that are unforeseeable and unrelated to
196
Internet hyperlinking.
The Internet user does not directly
infringe the owner’s distribution right through use of a
hyperlink.
d.

The Internet User Does Not Directly Infringe the Right to
Display the Work Publicly

The right to display one’s work publicly protects a
copyright owner from unauthorized display of her work.
Ticketmaster Online provides a Web page from which eventgoers may purchase tickets.
Ticketmaster displays the
document on the Web, and the user views it, and possibly
interacts with it, fulfilling Ticketmaster’s goal. The user
neither places the page on display nor transmits the document
to anyone else; by linking to the owner’s page, the user does not
implicate the owner’s right to display its work.
2.

Fair Use Defense Protects Internet User from Copyright
Infringement

Although the legal issues concerning whether the user
directly infringes the owner’s right to reproduce the work
197
remain unsettled, a court would likely find that the fair use
exception applies to the user viewing copyrighted Web sites
retrieved by hyperlinks. Even if a court holds that copies are
198
made in the user’s RAM, “the online world facilitates and
199
even requires the infinite creation of [such] copies.”
Consideration of the four factors used to determine the validity
of a fair use defense demonstrate that the user would likely be
found not liable for direct infringement.

196. See supra Part III.B.1.c (explaining that the link creator does
directly infringe because the link creator does not distribute copies of
work).
197. See supra Part III.B.1.a (explaining that the link creator does
directly infringe copyrights because the link creator does not reproduce
original work).
198. See id.
199. Roarty, supra note 148, at 1038.
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The Purpose and Character of the Use

The first factor a court considers in determining fair use is
200
the purpose of the use of the copyrighted work.
The Internet
is commonly characterized as harboring unbridled potential for
disseminating information.
The Internet’s unprecedented
growth since its inception demonstrates that it not only exists
as an effective, cost efficient, accessible method for conveying
information, but that users do actually engage in
cyberactivities frequently and with vigor. The Internet serves
a host of functions, ranging from personal, academic, and
educational to enjoyable, informative, and commercial. The
court must consider copyright claims in the context in which
they appear. When dealing with on-line activities concerning
publicly displayed documents, society’s First Amendment
interest in obtaining and disseminating information trumps
individuals’ interests in copyright.
In a more fact-specific context, the Ticketmaster example,
the user visiting the Seattle Sidewalk Web site presumably
searches for information useful in planning her trip or learning
more about the city. Although the user may purchase tickets
by visiting the Ticketmaster page and completing a commercial
transaction, she is not using the information for a commercial
purpose; that is, the user does not profit from the copyrighted
201
material without paying the customary price.
The user’s
purpose for allegedly copying the work is viewing Internet Web
pages, which has been called “the functional equivalent of
reading, which does not implicate copyright laws and may be
done by anyone in a library without the permission of the
202
copyright owner.”
Ticketmaster bases its objections to deep linking on the
argument that by entering its site directly at the order page,
rather than through the home page, the user avoids viewing
paid advertising throughout the site. If the link creator
purposely misleads the user, or intentionally diverts the user
from the owner’s home page for her own financial gain, courts
will consider a high degree of bad faith as weighing against a
finding of fair use, as the defense is consonant with moral

200. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 117-118 and accompanying text.
202. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Serv., Inc.,
907 F. Supp. 1361, 1378 n.25 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (Netcom II).
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203

rights and fair dealing. If the link creator does not attempt to
conceal the origin of the owner’s page, nor claim the page as its
own, a finding of bad faith would be unwarranted considering
the benefits of the hyperlink. In the situation where URL of
the owner’s page appears in the location bar, or even in the
more extreme situation where the link creator actually
attempts to pass off the owner’s page as its own, the propriety
of the link creator’s actions is not at issue. The merit of user’s
conduct is to be considered, and the purpose of browsing the
Internet using links is to obtain information easily and
expeditiously. The nature of the use of the copied work weighs
in favor of the user, as does the implied consent of the owner,
since “ordinary accessing of web sites itself involves the
repeated reproduction of material placed on and intended to be
204
accessed over the web.”
b.

The Nature of the Copyrighted Work

The court considers the nature of the copied work as the
205
second factor of a fair use defense. Although the Court has
determined that the public interest is greater in receiving
206
factual information than fictional, the nature of the medium
itself indicates that all Web sites should be equally accessible.
The Web thrives on user interaction; its sole function is to act
as a forum for public works, voluntarily published for
207
widespread public access and dissemination, like a pile of
fliers left in a park for the public to pick up and read. The
owner obviously created its Web site in anticipation that
Internet users will view it and possibly interact with it. By
publishing information on the Web and making it freely
accessible by hyperlinks, the owner cannot claim violation of its
208
right to control an unpublished work, nor can it claim an
209
interest in confidentiality. Furthermore, a deep link does not
change the nature of the work, but, like any link, “facilitates
203. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
204. Michael Zimmerman, Copyright in the Digital Electronic
Environment, in 1998 UNDERSTANDING BASIC COPYRIGHT LAW 543, 588 (PLI
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook
Series No G0-001K, 1998).
205. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
207. See supra Part I.
208. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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210

doing what any Web page invites—reading the page.”
Moreover, Ticketmaster itself has developed technology that
directs the user’s computer to open Ticketmaster’s homepage
211
The
open in a new window anytime a deep link occurs.
second factor clearly weighs in favor of a finding of the fair use
defense.
c.

The Amount and Substantiality of the Work Used

When the user links to the ticket order page, the page
specified by the URL is copied in the computer’s RAM. While
all of the pages of a Web site may be considered the work as a
whole, in which case the page copied comprises only a small
proportion of the work copied, it may also be considered an
individual work, in which case the computer displays it in its
212
While the amount and substantiality of the copied
entirety.
work appears to weigh in favor of the owner, the factors are to
213
be balanced in equity, and the other three factors weigh
toward a finding of fair use.
d.

The Effect on Market Value

The final factor the courts consider is the effect of the use
214
In the
on the market for or value of the copyrighted work.
Ticketmaster case, which involves a commercial transaction,
the question may be whether the user’s copying of the purchase
order page has an effect on the value of the on-line purchasing
page. The question may also be whether the user’s copying of
that particular page has an effect on the value of the Web site
as a whole. For purposes of the amount and substantiality of
the work factor, the owner would argue that the order page
constitutes a work as a whole, in which case the user’s copying
210. See Wassom, supra note 28, at 238.
211. See Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 147, at
*1. When deciding the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, the District Court
found that there had been significant changes in the circumstances of the case
since deciding the Motion to Dismiss. See id. The Court found that
“[Ticketmaster] devised technical methods of blocking direct access by “deep
linking” to [Ticketmaster] interior event pages.” Id. The Court also noted that
Ticketmaster may no longer be able to employ these defensive techniques. See
id.
212. See supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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has no effect on its market. That is, whether a user reaches the
page through a deep link directly to it or through a series of
links through Ticketmaster’s home page, the user will still
purchase tickets and Ticketmaster will still receive the same
profit in either situation.
Deep linking may have an effect on the market, however, if
the court considers the whole Web site as the work.
Ticketmaster claims that in bypassing the advertisements
located on its home page and throughout the site, the user
215
While it is true that a
deprives it of advertising revenue.
user retrieving the page through a deep link will not view the
advertisements, Ticketmaster would have a difficult time
proving that deep linking users would have otherwise seen the
advertisements or even solicited its Internet purchasing
services at all.
Ticketmaster’s claim is based on the
assumption that had the user not linked to the order page
through the Seattle Sidewalk site, she would have linked to the
order page by visiting the Ticketmaster home page directly. It
is quite possible that she would not have, and only by visiting
the Seattle Sidewalk site did she happen to arrive at the
Ticketmaster site. In this light, hyperlinks, including deep
links, actually increase the value of the work in two ways.
First, the link promotes the specific page and leads the user to
it; second, once a user links to one page of a site, she may
explore the rest of the site via links provided on the new
216
Despite the fact the user will not initially view the
page.
advertising on Ticketmaster’s home page by first linking
directly to the order page, the copying that occurs arguably
217
“can only benefit the target page.”
Based on the analysis above, the user, searching for
information on the Web, cannot be held liable for copyright
infringement. Even if a court finds that browsing the Internet
encroaches one of the owner’s statutory rights, it is extremely
likely that a user would be protected by the fair use defense,
largely due to the interactive nature of the Internet itself.
Thus if the user cannot be held liable for direct copyright
infringement, the link provider cannot be held liable for
contributory infringement.

215. See Complaint, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
216. See Wassom, supra note 28, at 235-38.
217. Id. at 237.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Ticketmaster’s hypothetical copyright claim against
Microsoft for deep linking to its site provides an poignant
example of how current copyright laws must be interpreted,
manipulated, and revised when applying it to the mercurial
medium of Internet communication. While one of the goals of
copyright law is to protect the unique expression of authors and
to encourage creation of literary, artistic and technological
works, the other is to disseminate information and creative
works. Creative and informative Web pages make up the
seamless Web of the Internet, and hyperlinks facilitate a user’s
ability to locate and access information. While Hypertext
Reference links between Web pages on the Internet may give
rise to a cause of action in another area of the law, copyright
claims should be avoided. In the balance of copyright law, the
author’s interest in limiting access to unprotected, publicized
works, is far outweighed by hyperlinks’ contributions to the
“infinite possibilities and opportunities for the sharing of
218
information on a global level.”

218. Andrepont, supra note 45, at 419-20.

